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1962/11/21

ARA

November 21, 1962

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: ARA - Edwin M. Martin
SUBJECT:

1. In October 27 letter the President stated that US would pledge itself not to invade Cuba if:

- a. Offensive weapons systems were removed
- b. There could be international verification that this had been done
- c. We had safeguards against their reintroduction

US position papers have always qualified the pledge by reference to US commitments under Rio Treaty, UN Charter and Punta del Este Resolutions and thus made it dependent on minimum standard of good behavior by Cuba.

2. We held this position until President's statement of November 20 when in absence of agreement on b and c, he said, not that we would not invade, but that there could be "peace in the Caribbean" if:

- a. We had UN verification
- b. We had safeguards against reintroduction
- c. Cuba did not attempt to export its aggressive purposes

3. It is now proposed, without any change having occurred in the Soviet or Cuban position, to pledge on behalf of US Government in security council that US will not invade if:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by

DATE 3-21-84

a. There

() UNCLASSIFIED () DECLASSIFY
() UNCLASSIFIED () DECLASSIFY IN PART
() UNCLASSIFIED () Non-Responsibility

FOR EO or PA exemptions (b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(3)

() CLASSIFY as () UNCLASSIFIED
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

- a. There is international verification of removal and against reintroduction

or

- b. US is satisfied by use of its own means that offensive weapons systems are not in Cuba.

4. This proposal retreats from previous one by abandoning:

- a. A verification on safeguards on ground in Cuba
- b. Requirement of minimum good behavior by Cuba

In addition it retreats from November 20 speech by making solemn no-invasion pledge, which that speech carefully did not do, even conditionally.

5. I would urge sticking to language of Presidential statement for following reasons:

- a. It is essential to establish pattern for future successful negotiation with Soviets to stick to sound US positions and particularly not to retreat from them in the face of Soviet failure to live up to its undertakings. This is also especially valid when crisis arises out of major Soviet aggressive action. Otherwise US negotiations will not be given necessary leeway by US people and Soviets will not negotiate with respect for firmness of our positions, but believe that with time they can count on getting what they want, despite failure to perform by them.
- b. The Latin American's have all along been deeply concerned by the no-invasion pledge and what it means for future of Castro. They fear him more than Soviet offensive weapons and will not feel they have been

helped

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helped materially if he stays on with undiminished power to act against them, despite his treachery in letting Soviets use Cuba as an offensive nuclear base. Thus to go out of our way to give the pledge without Soviet performance will not only mystify them but create serious distrust of US leadership and understanding, even of US interest in them and their problems.

- c. The US and Latin American public will not understand the sudden abandonment of US firmness which has earned us so far such handsome dividends. Especially the fall-back from the November 20 press statement will be hard to justify. I can think of no satisfactory explanation of the change of language, which will be closely compared. The need to close out the negotiations on a basis acceptable to Soviets, despite Soviet initial error and Soviet failure to perform, cannot be explained, especially in light of long history of indoctrination in essential evil of Soviets and their aims and continued efforts of Communist parties tied to Moscow to overthrow governments of hemisphere.
- d. While we may regard this lightly qualified, no invasion assurance as a concession to Khrushchev, for the Latin American's and the Cubans it will be looked upon solely as a concession to Castro, culminating his successful defiance of the USSR, the US and the UN. It may well regain for him a major share of the prestige he has lost in Latin America as a result of the evidence of the past few weeks.

ARA:EMMartin:jb
11/21/62

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